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Abstract 
While it is generally argued that a stronger labor market is negatively associated with crime, there exists 
a “consensus of doubt” around the relationship between employment and crime. This paper examines the 
impact of the rise of female labor participation in manufacturing on various types of crimes in Mexico 
from 1998 to 2012. A fixed effects specification and an instrumental variable approach with regional and 
time fixed effects are employed to compare the crime rates in municipalities that were heavily exposed to 
local factory openings to municipalities that did not receive a labor shock of the same magnitude.  By 
introducing a gender component in the analysis, we provide evidence of a gender differential impact of 
employment on various forms of crime. Our findings shed the light on the importance of gender in the 
crime-employment relationship and inform policy makers interested in designing crime prevention 
programs. 
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Introduction 
Over the last decades, many developing countries have industrialized and experienced a rise in female 
labor participation, especially in the export-oriented manufacturing sector. Given the puzzling 
relationship between labor market conditions and crime, this positive shocks has led to an upsurge of 
interest in discerning the impact of this increase on crime. This paper examines to what extant the rise of 
women working in the manufacturing sector has affected various types of crimes in Mexico. 
The Maquiladora Program is a Mexican Government initiative established in 1964 to attract foreign 
investment in assembly plants in towns along the border with the United States. In 1994, the passage of 
NAFTA gave rise to a new program called the Maquiladora Manufacturing Industry and Export Services 
(IMMEX) and expanded the Maquiladora system to the interior of Mexico.  Recent statistics from the 
Mexican Institute of Statistics (INEGI) suggest that Maquiladora firms employ 80 percent of Mexico's 
factory labor force and exports from Maquiladoras make up to 65 percent of the country's exports. Our 
paper will contribute to the growing literature in economics evaluating how large growth in low-skill 
jobs for young women in Mexico affects various outcomes such as fertility (Russov, 2016), child health 
(Atkin, 2009), and educational attainment (Atkin,2016). 
Mexico provides a perfect setting to study the impact of female labor participation on crime. Over the 
period spanned by the data (1998–2012), Mexico experienced massive openings and expansions of 
factories to manufacture products for export. Total employment in export manufacturing sectors rose 
from under 900,000 formal sector jobs at the beginning of 1986 to over 2.7 million jobs in 2000, with one 
million of these jobs in Maquiladora firms1. An interesting characteristic of those firms is that most of the 
workforce was made of female until the end of the 1990s when the skewed female-male ratio started to 
decrease. On the other hand, Mexico has also experienced the greatest increase in crimes among all Latin 
American countries, especially homicides during the last decades. Official estimates suggest that from 
2007 to 2011, homicide rates threefold nationally, from 8.1 to 24 per 100,000 inhabitants. 
                                                          
1 INEGI (Mexican National Institute of Statistics)  
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The World Bank’s statistics2 reveal that an increasing number of women are entering the workforce in 
Mexico. In 1990, female labor participation rate was 29.8%. This number rose to 37% in 2014 and is 
expected to increase. In that context, our study may pave the way to understanding the impact of female 
labor participation on crime.  From a policy perspective, the results of our research may assist the scientific 
community as well as policy makers to shed the light on the importance of gender in the crime-
employment relationship. 
1. Brief Overview of the Economic Models of Crime 
Unlike other sciences that have studies the roots of criminal behavior, the economic theories of crime do 
not model criminals as deviant individuals but rather as ordinary people who respond to some incentives, 
have certain preferences, or react to political and socio economic situations. A review of the literature 
suggests that economic theories on the roots of crime can be divided into three models: the rational model, 
the myopic model, and the radical political economic model. 
1.1. The Rational Model of Crime 
This model can be split up into a static and a dynamic model. In a static model (Becker (1968)3, decision 
of committing crime is driven by a cost/benefit analysis considering a single period. In a dynamic model, 
one compares the costs and benefits of crime in multiple time periods (Flinn ,1986) and individuals 
allocating time to criminal activities decrease the stock of social capita and thus are more likely to engage 
in a criminal activity because they have less to lose if they are apprehended (Williams and Sickles, 2000). 
 
 
 
                                                          
2 The World Bank databank, Labor force participation rate (% of total population ages 15+), 2016 
 
3 Becker’s article has 14019 citations in the Journal of Political Economy as of December 2016. 
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1.2. The Myopic Model of Crime/Present oriented Model of Crime 
Unlike the precedent models which assumed human beings to be rational, the myopic model explains 
why some individual would decide to commit a crime which yields negative returns in the long run. 
This model suggests that hyperbolic discounting (tendency for people to increasingly choose a smaller-sooner 
reward over a larger-later reward as the delay occurs sooner rather than later in time) is an explanatory factor of 
crime (Rabin (1999), O’Donoghue,(2002)). 
 
1.3. The Radical Political Economic Model of Crime 
Those models suggest that political and socioeconomic factors such as poverty and inequality (Gordon 
(1973) and Taylor, Walton, and Young (1975)), unemployment (Nickerson (1983)), and education 
(Lochner (1999) are underlying causes of criminal behavior. 
 
2. Empirical Research: Employment-Crime Relationship 
In his review of sixty-three empirical papers, Chiricos (1987) concluded that throughout the 1970s and 
much of the 1980s, there existed a “consensus of doubt” around the relationship between unemployment 
rate and crime rate (U-C) at the aggregate level. Many other economists have concluded that the U-C 
relationship, measured at the aggregate level, is both inconsistent and insignificant (Fox,1978; 
Witte,1981; Orsagh, 1980, Wilson and Herrnstein, 1985). 
Cantor and Land (1985) offer an argument to interpret the mixed empirical findings in the literature. 
Unemployment may affect crime via two effects: an opportunity effect and a motivation effect. Therefore, 
the effect that dominates will determine the direction of the correlation between crime and unemployment. 
Generally, problems of data quality and lack of strong identification strategy up to the 1990s made it 
extremely difficult to study the causal relationship between employment and crime. 
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Over the years, methodological improvements and the use of panel data (rather than cross-sections where 
estimates can be severely confounded by omitted variables) have allowed scholars to produce papers more 
likely to address the problem of endogeneity. Using prime defense contracts and a state-specific measure 
of exposure to oil shocks as instruments for unemployment rates, Raphael and Winter-Ebmer (2001) find 
that a decrease in unemployment rate in the US during the 1990s had a significant effect on the decline of 
property crime.  In a more recent paper, Lin (2008) builds on these approaches and find similar results by 
exploring a longer time span between 1974-2000, employing three different instruments: real exchange 
rate, state manufacturing sector percentage, and state union membership rates. However, those papers do 
not account for subpopulations more likely to commit a crime, nor do they account for demographic 
changes in the labor market. Additional weaknesses from these papers are their inability to account for 
unemployment benefits and the duration of unemployment, which can both affect criminal behavior. 
 
Rather than analyzing overall unemployment, a strand of the economic literature has focused its attention 
on individuals more likely to engage in a criminal activity, namely young, low-skilled and less educated 
males. Exploiting instrumental variables strategies, those papers use both panel data at the county level 
and individual-level data, thus allowing the authors to control for personal characteristics that are more 
likely to affect criminal behavior. Gould et al (2002) provide evidence that crime rates in the US from 
1979 to 1997 were significantly affected by both wages and unemployment rates of less educated males. 
Most importantly, the paper suggests that improving employment opportunities is as significant as 
improving the wages of less skilled men in the quest for reduction of crime rates.  Fougère et al. (2009) 
find evidence suggesting that youth unemployment increased property crimes but not violent crimes in 
France counties between 1990 and 2000.  Finally, Grönqvist (2013) finds a positive causal relationship 
between youth unemployment and crime, evidenced in both property and violent crimes in Sweden. While 
these papers suggest that high youth unemployment significantly impact crime rates, they do not consider 
gender effects, nor do they provide insights into the motivation underlying the impact of youth 
unemployment. 
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One of the major structural changes in the labor markets of many countries since World War II has been 
the rapid rise of female employment. Consequently, a branch of the economic literature has been dedicated 
to exploring the importance of gender effects in the (un) employment-crime relationship. However, early 
papers in this sub-literature failed to employ strong identification strategies for causal inference, and often 
revealed weak and mixed results. On one hand, studies finding a negative relationship between female 
employment and crime emphasize the “latch key care” theory (Hoffman, 1974; Vandell and Ramanan, 
1991; Aizer, 2004), the theory of “masculine identities” (Bourgois, 1996; Macmillan and Gartner, 1999) 
and the theory of “declining wages” (Hansen,2002).  The first theory stipulates that boys of working 
mothers are more likely to engage in anti-social behavior.  The second theory suggests that female 
employment creates a “crisis of masculinity” and increases women’s risk of domestic violence. The third 
theory suggests that female labor participation puts a downward wage pressure on males in lower skilled 
jobs who are more likely to engage in criminal activities.  On the other hand, Kapuscinski (1998)’s findings 
of a positive relationship between female unemployment and crime supports the idea that unemployed 
women who depend on a violent male breadwinner have no other option than continuing to expose 
themselves and their children to violence (“victimization theory”). 
 
To the best of my knowledge, Hernandez (2015) is the first economic paper employing a strong 
identification strategy to infer causality in this sub-branch of the literature. The paper exploits a 
difference-in-difference strategy and an IV strategy to provide evidence that shocks to a female-intensive 
industry (flower) serve as a catalyst to curb unorganized violence, while shocks to a more male-oriented 
sector (coffee) increases unorganized violence, but reduce conflictual violence in Colombia. 
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Despite considerable progress made in the economics literature to study the employment-crime 
relationship, several questions remain ambiguous and there is room for future research ideas. One of the 
areas that could be incorporated is the quality of the law enforcement and the justice system when it comes 
to studying crime in developing countries. In addition, future research looking specifically at domestic 
violence should consider the within-industry and the between-industry wage gap between men and 
women. Conclusively, there is still no consensus as to whether labor participation rate or unemployment 
rate is a more appropriate proxy for labor market conditions. 
 
Any study of the causal effect of employment on crime confronts the problem of endogeneity. Our paper 
elaborates on the aforementioned studies by looking at the expansion of female employment in the 
manufacturing sector in Mexico, which represents a shock to the economic environment of women. Our 
paper addresses the threat of endogeneity by employing an IV strategy to compare the impact of 
maquiladoras shocks on various forms of crime and contrast it to other less female-oriented sectors. 
 
3. Data and Trends of Maquiladora Employment and Crime in Mexico 
3.1. Data Sources 
The employment panel data comes from a database of the Mexican Social Security Institute (IMSS) which 
provides employment information of all formal private sector companies by gender, year and municipality 
from 1998 to 2012. 
Data on various types of crime at the state level (robbery, assault, rapes, various forms of violence against 
women, kidnappings, and extortions) are provided by the National Institute of Statistics, Geography, and 
Information (INEGI). 
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3.2. Descriptive statistics 
A breakdown of the female workforce composition by sector shows that Maquiladoras are the main source 
of female employment over the period covered by my data (Figure 1).  Moreover, the trend of Maquiladora 
employment by gender reveals that the essential workforce in the Maquiladoras is male, consistent with 
official statistics suggesting that Maquiladoras gradually started hiring more males by the end of the 
1990s. 
As shown in Figure 2, employment in the manufacturing sector had been on the rise but experienced a 
sharp decline both in the years 2001 and 2008, which mark the US recession that has without a doubt 
affected the Mexican economy. Figure 3 illustrates the average crime rates by category and reveals that 
the top 3 frequent crimes over the sample period are robberies, assaults, and extortions. 
 
4. Identification Strategy 
 
Our first identification strategy regresses crime rate on a measure of local expansions in manufacturing 
employment: 
𝑦𝑚𝑡=β0+β1M𝑚𝑡+α𝑚+α𝑚t+ α𝑠𝑡 +𝜀                                                                                        (1) 
where M𝑚𝑡 is the employment growth rate in region m, ymtis the crime rate in region m at year t,  αm 
and α𝑡 represent the regional and year fixed effects respectively. 
 
This empirical strategy compares the crime levels in municipalities that were heavily exposed to local 
factory openings in Maquiladoras to municipalities that did not receive a labor shock of the same 
magnitude at that period. 
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In addition to specification (1), we will test a fixed effect regression model with the ratio of female jobs to 
male jobs in the manufacturing sector: 
𝑦𝑚𝑡=β0+β1𝑋𝑚𝑡−1+α𝑚+α𝑚t+ α𝑠𝑡 +𝜀                                                                                   (2) 
where 𝑋𝑚 is the ratio of female jobs to male jobs, ymt is the crime rate in region m at year t,  α𝑚 and α𝑡 
represent the regional and year fixed effects respectively. 
 
Our dependent and independent variables are both converted in logarithmic forms. First, this 
transformation will simplify the interpretation of our results as a given absolute numerical change 
represents a given percent change. Second, natural logs are used so that estimates across multiple 
specifications are comparable. Finally, to strengthen our results, we will control for unemployment, 
education, and GDP per capita and the standard errors will be clustered at the regional level. 
 
 
5. Threats to Identification 
 
Omitted variables will bias coefficients if a third factor affects both municipality crime level and the 
characteristics of the municipality that drive the decisions of factories to locate in those municipalities.  
For instance, if factories locate in poorer regions to pay lower wages, there will be a spurious correlation 
between crime and female employment. Similarly, if factories locate in regions with high-skilled workers, 
we will wrongly identify a positive correlation between crime and employment. 
 
The municipality and year fixed effects in equations (1) and (2) above eliminate time-invariant 
characteristics of the municipality. Clustered standard errors at the municipality level prevent misleading 
inference due to serial correlation in the error term across years within a municipality (Bertrand, Duflo, 
and Mullainathan 2004). 
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While the models proposed in equation (1) and (2) are likely to address the problem of omitted variables 
bias, we still need to address another endogeneity issue which is that factories could locate based on crime 
levels. As a matter of fact, if factories are relocating in less crime prone regions, then employment and 
crime will be negatively correlated. 
The regression estimates obtained with the models described above will only measure the magnitude of 
an association, rather than the causation that we are trying to identify. To mitigate concerns about 
endogeneity and to strengthen our results, we propose to employ an instrumental variable strategy 
described in the following paragraphs. 
6. Instrumental Variable Strategy 
My identification strategy builds on the approach originally employed by Bartik (1991). The “Bartik 
instrument” or “Shift-share instrument” is one of the most popular instrument used in Labor Economics 
to isolate labor demand shocks from labor supply shocks4. Specifically, lagged local industrial composition 
is interacted with industrial growth rates at the national level to generate a predicted local labor demand 
shock. In this paper, I instrument for female employment using state employment growth rates in the 
manufacturing industry weighted by the share of female manufacturing jobs at the city level:  
𝑧𝑟𝑡 = ∑𝑖=1 
𝐼 g𝑟𝑡 S𝑟𝑡−1                                                                                                               (3) 
where  z𝑟𝑡   is the predicted employment,  S𝑟𝑡 is the industry’s share of total employment in region r at 
time t-1, and g𝑟𝑡  represents   employment growth rate in region r between times t-1 and t. 
The intuition behind this instrument is that if one municipality has a large employment share in the 
manufacturing sector and employment in that sector increases across the country, we would expect local 
employment to increase as well.  The identifying assumption is that if a positive (negative) shock at the 
national level can lead to a positive (negative) shock at the local level, then the IV should be a valid 
predictor of actual local employment. 
                                                          
4 See, for example, Bartik (1991); Blanchard and Katz (1992); Bound and Holzer (2000); Notowidigdo (2013); Diamond (2012). 
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Like any IV, the Bartik instrument needs to satisfy the strong first stage and the exclusion restriction 
conditions. The first condition requires that the employment growth rates at the local level be strongly 
correlated with the instrument (F≥10). 
The second condition requires that the instrument be uncorrelated with crime rates.  In order words, 
predicted employment must not be correlated with local labor supply shocks.  Put differently, a valid 
Bartik IV requires that the national changes in an industry are not due to changes within a single 
municipality.  As argued by Rossov (2016), local industries such as the service industry are less likely to 
be sensitive to national trends. However, a demand shock to internationally traded goods is likely due to 
exogenously determined factors that affect local employment in the sectors producing those goods. 
Furthermore, two more arguments are in favor of the Bartik IV for the manufacturing sector. First, the 
diversification of Mexico’s manufacturing sector across regions allows a spatial variation in how sensitive 
municipalities are to exogenous demand shocks. Second, the harsh Asian competition in some sub-sectors 
is not felt equally across all regions, leading to another source of spatial variation. 
7. Fixed Effects Results 
We exploit a database providing various forms of crime at the state level. To simplify our analysis, we 
present our results by grouping our crime variables in three categories, specifically violent crimes (sexual 
assaults, and aggravated assault), property crimes (robbery, carjacking, bank robbery) and economic 
crimes (breach of trust, extortions, fraud). 
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7.1. Maquila shocks and economic crimes 
We first look at crimes purely seeking financial gain and committed by means of deception. Probably 
because those crimes do not necessarily involve physical violence, they have not received much attention 
in previous economic studies.  However, those offenses cause great financial and mental harms to the 
victims and deserve more attention (Davies, 2003 & Mc Gurrin,2010) 
Economic crimes, which include extortions, breach of trust and fraud, have become a major problem in 
Mexico.  In 2014, Mexico ranked sixth in the list of countries that experienced cybercrimes and was 
number one in Latin America, followed by Brazil and Colombia. Among the most recurring cybercrimes 
reported in this category of crimes are credit card fraud, malicious code, identity theft, ransomware, and 
crypto-ransomware. 
Table 2 shows that incidence of extortions and breach of trust increases with female employment but 
decreases with male employment. Consistent with our hypothesis, we show that economic crimes increase 
in areas with larger expansions of the maquiladora industry because more employed people are likely to 
be targeted by criminals. 
7.2. Maquila shocks and property crimes 
We turn to the impact of employment on property crimes. The coefficient estimates in Table 3  are 
consistent with the economic theory that predicts a strong causal link between employment and property 
crimes - such as robbery and burglary, in which money is often a motive. In other words, our results are 
in line with the “opportunity effect” that implies that strong labor conditions mean more goods worth 
stealing, and fewer people staying at home to guard them (Cantor,1985). Interestingly, we find that the 
estimates for male employment are smaller in magnitude but negatives. Again, property increase with 
female employment but decrease with male employment. 
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7.3. Maquila shocks and violent crimes 
Finally, we look at violent crimes and we find no significant effect of employment on sexual offences and 
aggravated assaults (Table 4). Generally, the lack of causal link between employment and violent crimes 
suggests that those types of crimes are less closely associated with economic hardship (Philips et al, 2012). 
 
However, I find that aggravated assaults tend to increase when female employment goes up and decrease 
when male employment goes up. On one hand, we can argue that assaults are typically driven by the 
intent to provoke physical harm rather than pursuing economic motives. It may therefore be surprising 
that we find a significant relationship between employment and aggravated assaults. However, it is worth 
noting that the effects of employment on assaults may be amplified through its effects on property crimes. 
Given that property states crimes are often perpetrated in conjunction with assaults (or may result in 
assaults), it may be the case that more male employment lowers the benefit of acquisitive crimes and thus 
brings down the incidence of aggravated assaults. 
8. Instrumental Variable Estimates 
Predicted employment is highly correlated with actual employment, and the first stage appears strong. 
The regression estimates obtained employing an instrumental variable approach (Table 5) suggest that 
exogenous shocks to male and female employment in manufacturing differentially affect crime rates. 
Those estimates are consistent with the fixed effects results and suggest that positive shocks to men’s 
labor demand decrease the rates of various types of crimes, in contrast to female employment.  
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9. Robustness checks 
It can be argued that the Mexican War on Drugs launched in 2006 created a wave of violence and may be 
driving my results. Therefore, I test for a structural break by running a regression before and after the so 
called Mexican War on Drug. The results presented in Table 7 remain consistent for personal and 
property crimes before and after the structural break. However, we find no gender differential impact of 
employment on extortions during the so-called War on Drugs. It is worth noting that Mexico is a country 
where extortion is a booming industry and is perpetrated by criminal organizations rather than isolated 
individuals. As a matter of fact, there is suggestive evidence that since the President Felipe Calderón 
began his crackdown against drug cartels in 2007, the Mexican government has focused its actions on 
targeting their leaders and fracture the large DTOs into smaller ones. Thus, those smaller organizations 
have started to diversify their activities and specialize in less riskier activities such as extortions. As a 
matter of fact, the National Survey on Victimization and Public Safety 5 suggest that extortions remained 
the second most frequent crime in Mexico in 2012, with 7,585 extortions committed for every 100,000 
residents as compared with 5,653 in 2011, a 34% increase. 
 
A second robustness check we estimate a regression by grouping states by level of crime based on the 
Mexico Peace Index which is a National Peace Index produced by the Institute for Economics and Peace. 
The MPI measures the level of peacefulness in Mexico and rank each state by the level of peacefulness.  
Specifically, the index aggregates data from public surveys as well as official data and is based on 5 
indicators: incarceration rates, rates of organized crimes, rates of violent crimes, police funding and 
efficiency of the Justice System. Table 6 reports OLS and IV results that are robust regardless of the initial 
level of violence in a state. In other words, my results are robust as well in crime-prone states as in safe 
states. 
  
 
                                                          
5 INEGI, Encuesta Nacional de Victimización y Percepción sobre Inseguridad (ENVIPE 2012) 
15 
 
Conclusion 
In this paper, I use a unique dataset to explore the role that employment growth in manufacturing play 
on various forms of crime. My main finding suggests an asymmetric result where property crimes and 
economic crimes increase with female employment but decrease as male employment increases. Consistent 
with Hernandez (2015), I find suggestive evidence that various types of crimes are positively correlated 
with male employment and negatively associated with male employment 
 
In the economic literature, statistics have been consistent in reporting that men are more likely to commit 
crime. Therefore, our results support the idea that the motivation effect of acquisitive crimes goes down 
as men have more job opportunities. On the other hand, the results we find with female employment may 
indicate that the more women are entering the workforce, the more likely they are exposed to various 
forms of violence. In other words, this result is in line with the theory of “masculine identities” (Bourgois, 
1996; Macmillan and Gartner, 1999, Kapuscinski, 1998). 
 
This paper provides evidence in a wide variety of models and robustness checks that international trade 
agreements, which dramatically increase employment opportunity for females, have a gender differential 
impact on different types of crime.  This is particularly an interesting result given the anecdotal evidence 
that suggests that female Maquiladoras employment are associated with violent crimes (Femicide in 
Ciudad Juarez between 1993 and 2003).  I have shown in this study that maquila jobs did not increase 
violent crimes, but did contribute to the increase of acquisitive crimes in Mexico from 1998 to 2012. 
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APPENDIX 
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES N mean sd 
    
Homicides 423 30.80 17.57 
Extortions 423 258.1 172.3 
Rapes 423 13.53 6.714 
Assault 423 220.7 119.9 
Threats & other sexual crimes 423 415.5 341.3 
Kidnapping 423 0.756 2.051 
Common Robbery 423 543.7 436.6 
Bank Robbery 423 0.452 0.725 
Female manufacturing 423 1,307 1,254 
Male manufacturing 423 2,405 1,933 
    
Note: The various crime rates are calculated by dividing the number of reported crimes by the total population; the 
result is multiplied by 100,000. The male and female manufacturing rates are calculated by dividing the number of 
jobs in manufacturing by gender by the total population; the result is multiplied by 100,000. 
 
Figure 1: Average number of female jobs in Mexico per sector 
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Figure 2: Trend of manufacturing jobs by gender 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 : Average number of incidents by type of crime 
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Table 2: Results for Economic Crimes 
          
 
Abuse of Confidence Fraud Extortions Abuse of Confidence Fraud Extortions Abuse of Confidence Fraud Extortions 
1. Growth-Based 
Model    
 
   
 
 
Female employment 1.902* 1.451 2.377*** 1.966* 1.587 2.387*** 0.728 0.475 1.225* 
 
(1.110) (1.069) (0.760) (1.149) (1.056) (0.819) (0.556) (0.419) (0.694) 
Male employment -0.783** -0.331 -1.948*** -0.819* -0.536 -1.827*** -0.0939 0.0499 -0.848 
 
(0.379) (0.457) (0.492) (0.430) (0.475) (0.486) (0.490) (0.571) (0.614) 
Observations 446 446 435 433 433 423 433 433 423 
R-squared 0.889 0.882 0.860 0.891 0.884 0.865 0.933 0.927 0.895 
          
2. Ratio-Based-Model 
         
Female/Male 3.983* 2.774 5.150*** 4.132* 3.089 5.158*** 1.474* 0.687 2.824** 
 
(2.159) (2.042) (1.552) (2.252) (2.027) (1.671) (0.807) (0.609) (1.339) 
Observations 446 446 435 433 433 423 433 433 423 
R-squared 0.885 0.878 0.858 0.887 0.880 0.863 0.932 0.926 0.895 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
State-time trends N N N N N N Y Y Y 
Controls N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y 
          
Clustered Standard Errors at the State Level 
                 * p < 0.10,    ** p < 0.05,   *** p < 0.01    
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Table 3: Economic Crimes 
 
  
 
              
 Robberies Carjacking Bank Robberies Robberies Carjacking Bank Robberies Robberies Carjacking Bank Robberies 
 1. Growth-Based Model            
Female employment 1.211* 2.265* 1.251 1.242* 2.521** 1.213 0.601 1.697 0.387 
 
(0.607) (1.215) (1.512) (0.643) (1.184) (1.476) (0.376) (1.250) (1.092) 
Male employment  -0.817 -0.209 -0.784 -0.771 -0.108 -0.609 -0.467 -0.220 -0.464 
 
(0.591) (1.141) (1.539) (0.547) (1.088) (1.489) (0.468) (1.684) (1.280) 
Observations 448 214 370 435 210 357 435 210 357 
R-squared 0.945 0.805 0.694 0.947 0.816 0.705 0.964 0.861 0.801 
          
2. Ratio-Based-Model 
         
Female/Male  2.846** 4.729* 2.233 2.938** 5.398* 2.074 1.393** 3.347 0.514 
 
(1.243) (2.748) (3.606) (1.309) (2.607) (3.579) (0.646) (3.354) (2.371) 
Observations  448 214 370 435 210 357 435 210 366 
R-squared 0.945 0.800 0.698 0.947 0.811 0.703 0.964 0.859 0.797 
Year FE Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y Y Y 
State-time trends N N N N N N Y Y Y 
Controls N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y 
 
                  
  
                                        Clustered SE at state level     
                            * p < 0.10,    ** p < 0.05,   *** p < 0.01    
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Table 4: Personal Crimes         
 Assaults Sexual Assaults Assaults Sexual Assaults Assaults Sexual Assaults 
 1. Growth-Based Model        
Female employment 1.318* 0.251 1.338* 0.288 0.639 0.583 
 
(0.800) (0.384) (0.768) (0.350) (0.485) (0.473) 
Male employment  -0.940* 0.145 -0.879* 0.111 -0.539 -0.495 
 
(0.486) (0.357) (0.512) (0.370) (0.431) (0.431) 
Observations 447 448 434 435 434 434 
R-squared 0.938 0.912 0.943 0.916 0.964 0.964 
       
2. Ratio-Based-Model 
      
Female/Male  2.606* 0.500 2.746* 0.591 1.164* 0.0665 
 
(1.534) (0.808) (1.610) (0.735) (0.678) (0.428) 
Observations  447 448 434 435 443 444 
R-squared 0.937 0.911 0.940 0.915 0.964 0.948 
              
Year FE Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  
State-time trends N N N N N N 
Controls N N N Y Y Y 
              
Clustered Standard Errors at the State Level 
  * p < 0.10,    ** p < 0.05,   *** p < 0.01   
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Table 5: Instrumental Variable Estimates 
      
 
      
 
Personal Crimes Property Crimes Economic Crimes 
 
   
 
 
 
 
Assaults Sexual Assaults Robberies Bank Robberies Abuse of Confidence Extortions 
       
Female employment 1.338* 0.308 1.681* 2.393 2.155* 2.715*** 
 
(0.757) (0.404) (0.859) (2.094) (1.264) (0.906) 
Male employment -0.242 0.201 -0.489 -1.449 -0.584 -1.496* 
 
(0.688) (0.488) (0.769) (1.826) (0.805) (0.749) 
Observations 191 192 192 157 191 185 
R-squared 0.933 0.913 0.937 0.726 0.883 0.847 
State FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y 
       
                      Clustered Standard Errors at the State Level  
  * p < 0.10,    ** p < 0.05,   *** p < 0.01   
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Table 6: Robustness Check: 
War on Drug 
                
 
PRE-WAR ON DRUG 
 
POST-WAR ON DRUG 
 
Assaults Robberies Extortions 
 
Assaults Robberies Extortions 
Female employment 1.186 0.841 1.746 
 
0.514 1.180** 0.548 
 
(1.075) (1.211) (1.047) 
 
(0.477) (0.535) (0.767) 
Male employment -1.035 -3.826* -1.792* 
 
-0.399 -0.545 0.180 
 
(0.895) (1.943) (1.016) 
 
(0.580) (0.547) (0.976) 
Observations 192 146 186 
 
222 222 217 
R-squared 0.957 0.890 0.899 
 
0.966 0.950 0.907 
State FE Y Y Y 
 
Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y 
 
Y Y Y 
Controls Y Y Y 
 
Y Y Y 
                
Clustered Standard Errors at the State Level 
        * p < 0.10,    ** p < 0.05,   *** p < 0.01   
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Table 7: Robustness Check: 
 Most Peaceful States and Least Peaceful States 
                
 
SAFE STATES 
 
DANGEROUS STATES 
    
Female employment 0.329 1.080** 1.446* 
 
1.950 1.429 2.561* 
 
(0.432) (0.485) (0.815) 
 
(1.138) (0.871) (1.260) 
Male employment -0.333 -0.821 -0.984 
 
-1.267* -0.899 -2.210** 
 
(0.644) (0.608) (0.822) 
 
(0.636) (0.733) (0.785) 
Observations 238 230 226 
 
209 210 204 
R-squared 0.944 0.953 0.846 
 
0.932 0.926 0.885 
State FE Y Y Y 
 
Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y 
 
Y Y Y 
Controls Y Y Y 
 
Y Y Y 
                
Clustered Standard Errors at the State Level 
  
* p < 0.10,    ** p < 0.05,   *** p < 0.01 
  
 
